PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION, TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVERS, AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTION

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<jats:p>Using a mixed oligopoly model with foreign ownership, this paper examines the interaction between two market‐opening policies: the relaxation of foreign ownership restriction and the privatization of domestic public firms. It particularly focuses on technology spillovers, which could be one of the most prominent motivations for introducing foreign investment into a domestic market. The first result demonstrates that the optimal level of privatization is affected by technology spillovers from foreign investment and is negatively related with the magnitude of technology spillovers. The second result shows that the optimal level of privatization is lower when foreign ownership restriction is abolished than that when foreign ownership is not fully allowed. The third result indicates that the government relaxes regulations on foreign ownership of domestic firms only if the magnitude of technology spillovers is significant.</jats:p>

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