Endogenous public and private leadership with diverging social and private marginal costs

DOI Web Site Web Site Web Site 被引用文献1件 参考文献58件

この論文をさがす

説明

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with price competition and different social versus private marginal costs. We find that any equilibrium timing patterns—Bertrand, Stackelberg with private leadership, Stackelberg with public leadership, and multiple Stackelberg equilibria—emerge. When the foreign ownership share in a private firm is less than 50%, public leadership is more likely to emerge than private leadership. Conversely, private leadership can emerge in a unique equilibrium when the foreign ownership share in a private firm is large. These results may explain recent policy changes in public financial institutions in Japan. We also find there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the welfare advantage of public and private leadership and the difference between social and private marginal costs for a private firm. A nonmonotonic relationship does not emerge in profit ranking. Similar results are obtained under quantity competition, although some properties are different.</jats:p>

収録刊行物

被引用文献 (1)*注記

もっと見る

参考文献 (58)*注記

もっと見る

関連プロジェクト

もっと見る

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ