{"@context":{"@vocab":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/schema/1.0/","rdfs":"http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#","dc":"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/","dcterms":"http://purl.org/dc/terms/","foaf":"http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/","prism":"http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/basic/2.0/","cinii":"http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ns/1.0/","datacite":"https://schema.datacite.org/meta/kernel-4/","ndl":"http://ndl.go.jp/dcndl/terms/","jpcoar":"https://github.com/JPCOAR/schema/blob/master/2.0/"},"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1361137046276196480.json","@type":"Article","productIdentifier":[{"identifier":{"@type":"DOI","@value":"10.1257/aer.102.1.337"}},{"identifier":{"@type":"URI","@value":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/aer.102.1.337"}}],"dc:title":[{"@value":"A Continuous Dilemma"}],"description":[{"type":"abstract","notation":[{"@value":"<jats:p> We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma. (JEL C72, C78, C91) </jats:p>"}]}],"creator":[{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1380298337263189888","@type":"Researcher","foaf:name":[{"@value":"Daniel Friedman"}],"jpcoar:affiliationName":[{"@value":"Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064."}]},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1381137046276196481","@type":"Researcher","foaf:name":[{"@value":"Ryan Oprea"}],"jpcoar:affiliationName":[{"@value":"Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064."}]}],"publication":{"publicationIdentifier":[{"@type":"PISSN","@value":"00028282"}],"prism:publicationName":[{"@value":"American Economic Review"}],"dc:publisher":[{"@value":"American Economic Association"}],"prism:publicationDate":"2012-02-01","prism:volume":"102","prism:number":"1","prism:startingPage":"337","prism:endingPage":"363"},"reviewed":"false","url":[{"@id":"https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/aer.102.1.337"}],"createdAt":"2012-02-08","modifiedAt":"2020-06-02","relatedProduct":[{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1360286990875646848","@type":"Article","resourceType":"学術雑誌論文(journal article)","relationType":["isReferencedBy"],"jpcoar:relatedTitle":[{"@value":"The effects of population size and information update rates on the emergent patterns of cooperative clusters in a large-scale social particle swarm model"}]},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1360298337263189888","@type":"Article","resourceType":"学術雑誌論文(journal article)","relationType":["isReferencedBy"],"jpcoar:relatedTitle":[{"@value":"Overcoming problems of coordination and freeriding in a game with multiple public goods: dynamic contribution with information provision"}]},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1360576118747423872","@type":"Article","resourceType":"学術雑誌論文(journal article)","relationType":["isReferencedBy"],"jpcoar:relatedTitle":[{"@value":"Communication, choice continuity, and player number in a continuous-time public goods experiment"}]},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1360848664364602624","@type":"Article","resourceType":"学術雑誌論文(journal article)","relationType":["isReferencedBy"],"jpcoar:relatedTitle":[{"@value":"An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment"}]},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1390299605467707392","@type":"Article","relationType":["isReferencedBy"],"jpcoar:relatedTitle":[{"@language":"en","@value":"AN IOT-BASED EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING CONTINUOUS SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN A GAME-THEORETICAL AND FACE-TO-FACE SITUATION WITH HUMAN PARTICIPANTS"}]},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1390862555421154944","@type":"Article","relationType":["isReferencedBy"],"jpcoar:relatedTitle":[{"@language":"en","@value":"SOCIAL PARTICLE SWARM MODEL FOR INVESTIGATING THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS"}]}],"dataSourceIdentifier":[{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.1257/aer.102.1.337"},{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.2117/psysoc.2023-b041_references_DOI_RmC8dApRss1nZxaU8VJLYoFYCXa"},{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.1007/s10015-019-00558-6_references_DOI_RmC8dApRss1nZxaU8VJLYoFYCXa"},{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.1007/s42973-023-00133-6_references_DOI_RmC8dApRss1nZxaU8VJLYoFYCXa"},{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.2117/psysoc.2023-b039_references_DOI_RmC8dApRss1nZxaU8VJLYoFYCXa"},{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.1007/s11403-021-00334-5_references_DOI_RmC8dApRss1nZxaU8VJLYoFYCXa"},{"@type":"CROSSREF","@value":"10.3389/fevo.2018.00074_references_DOI_RmC8dApRss1nZxaU8VJLYoFYCXa"}]}