In France, by a revision of the laws on bioethics in 2004, the indication of the preimplantation diagnosis was extended. This means that, in order to treat the first child who is suffering from Fanconi anemia, giving birth to a second child who is HLA compatible with the first, with the aid of that diagnosis, is now permitted by law. Considering the philosophical justification of the utilization of others' bodies to treat patients, on the one hand, saving patients is the duty of society in conformity with the principle of solidarity. But on the other hand, the donation of parts of the body for this treatment must be based on voluntary self-sacrifice in conformity with the principle of autonomy. And yet doesn't the request that the second child, who has no will or existence, become the means of treating the first, come from excessive solidarity? Shouldn't the consideration of dignity, integrity or vulnerability of the second child come before that of solidarity?
Bioethics 19 (1), 29-36, 2009
Japan Association for Bioethics