{"@context":{"@vocab":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/schema/1.0/","rdfs":"http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#","dc":"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/","dcterms":"http://purl.org/dc/terms/","foaf":"http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/","prism":"http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/basic/2.0/","cinii":"http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ns/1.0/","datacite":"https://schema.datacite.org/meta/kernel-4/","ndl":"http://ndl.go.jp/dcndl/terms/","jpcoar":"https://github.com/JPCOAR/schema/blob/master/2.0/"},"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1390001205291395328.json","@type":"Article","productIdentifier":[{"identifier":{"@type":"DOI","@value":"10.11555/kyoiku.82.1_36"}},{"identifier":{"@type":"NDL_BIB_ID","@value":"026372500"}},{"identifier":{"@type":"URI","@value":"http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/026372500"}},{"identifier":{"@type":"URI","@value":"https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I026372500"}},{"identifier":{"@type":"NAID","@value":"130005152514"}}],"dc:title":[{"@language":"ja","@value":"ロールズのメリトクラシー批判—機会の平等論の転換に向けて—"},{"@language":"en","@value":"An Examination of the Rawlsian Critique of Meritocracy: Toward a Transformation of Arguments on Equality of Opportunity"},{"@value":"ロールズのメリトクラシー批判 : 機会の平等論の転換に向けて"},{"@language":"ja-Kana","@value":"ロールズ ノ メリトクラシー ヒハン : キカイ ノ ビョウドウロン ノ テンカン ニ ムケテ"}],"dc:language":"ja","description":[{"type":"abstract","notation":[{"@language":"en","@value":"As Michael Young described in <i>The Rise of Meritocracy</i>, while the realization of meritocracy appears to liberate people’s life prospects from the fetters of their birth and heritage, the formal equality of opportunity as an element of meritocracy does not necessary lead to their social and economic equality. Indeed, meritocracy possibly even widens the gaps between people. Thus, methods of securing equality of opportunity and educational opportunity have been a serious and controversial topic in educational debates.<br> In this paper, I consider John Rawls’ theory of justice and clarify its implications for problems concerning meritocracy and equality of opportunity. In examining Rawls’ critical view on meritocracy, I focus on the moral reasoning in order to discuss and explore the rationale for pursuing the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity. By doing so, I will try to propose a way to transform a certain kind of schema often assumed within arguments on equality of opportunity.<br> Although some debaters insist that solely guaranteeing the formal equality of opportunity is insufficient, their arguments are usually strongly opposed when they proceed to more substantive or egalitarian conceptions of equal opportunity. In such cases, it is often emphasized that the idea of equality conflicts with that of liberty, and the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity is taken up as a representative of the egalitarian side.<br> I, however, avoid both stressing this conflict and defending the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity from a standpoint of egalitarianism. As Derek Parfit points out, some kinds of egalitarianism have intrinsic difficulties such as ‘leveling down.’ Therefore, I take a negative stance on using such egalitarian reasoning, especially within debates on equality of opportunity without relation to its conflict with liberty. Does this mean, then, that we should give up holding a Rawlsian substantive rather than formal view on equal opportunity? My answer is no.<br> Reinterpreting Rawls’ text, I find that there is a different reason to support his arguments on equality of opportunity. When he makes a case for the principle of fair equality of opportunity and prior distribution of educational resources for people in a less favorable position, he emphasizes that their role consists of, for example, enabling people to experience the realization of self and to take part in social affairs. Thus, I define these roles as promoting effective freedom, which cannot be reduced to the logic of equalization. In conclusion, we can say that merely securing the formal equality of opportunity is insufficient not because it results in inequality but because it still undeservedly places restrictions on less favored people’s effective freedom from a Rawlsian perspective. In addition, the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity can be considered as further pursuing the liberation of people’ life prospects, which is indicated in meritocracy."},{"@language":"ja","@value":"本稿は、J. ロールズによるメリトクラシーへの批判的視点を検討することで、機会の平等をめぐる議論に従来と異なる視点を提供することを試みる。機会の平等を論ずる際、しばしば自由と平等という理念的対立が強調され、ロールズは平等の側に位置づけられる。これに対し本稿は、平等主義の理論的困難をふまえつつ、むしろロールズの主張には自由の観点が見出せることを指摘し、最終的に平等な自由の再定義の必要性を主張する。"}],"abstractLicenseFlag":"disallow"}],"creator":[{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1030581148838939136","@type":"Researcher","personIdentifier":[{"@type":"NRID","@value":"9000017581039"},{"@type":"NRID","@value":"9000383212146"},{"@type":"NRID","@value":"9000406197416"},{"@type":"RESEARCHMAP","@value":"https://researchmap.jp/hironorikojima"}],"foaf:name":[{"@language":"ja","@value":"児島 博紀"},{"@language":"en","@value":"KOJIMA Hironori"}],"jpcoar:affiliationName":[{"@language":"en","@value":"Graduate Student, The University of Tokyo"},{"@language":"ja","@value":"東京大学（院生）"}]}],"publication":{"publicationIdentifier":[{"@type":"PISSN","@value":"03873161"},{"@type":"EISSN","@value":"21875278"},{"@type":"NDL_BIB_ID","@value":"000000005137"},{"@type":"ISSN","@value":"03873161"},{"@type":"LISSN","@value":"03873161"},{"@type":"NCID","@value":"AN00056578"}],"prism:publicationName":[{"@language":"ja","@value":"教育学研究"},{"@language":"en","@value":"THE JAPANESE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH"},{"@language":"en","@value":"Kyoikugaku Kenkyu"},{"@language":"ja","@value":"教育学研究"},{"@language":"en","@value":"The Japanese Journal of Educational Research"}],"dc:publisher":[{"@language":"en","@value":"Japanese Educational Research Association"},{"@language":"ja","@value":"一般社団法人 日本教育学会"}],"prism:publicationDate":"2015","prism:volume":"82","prism:number":"1","prism:startingPage":"36","prism:endingPage":"47"},"url":[{"@id":"http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/026372500"},{"@id":"https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I026372500"}],"availableAt":"2015","foaf:topic":[{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=%E3%82%B8%E3%83%A7%E3%83%B3%E3%83%BB%E3%83%AD%E3%83%BC%E3%83%AB%E3%82%BA","dc:title":"ジョン・ロールズ"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=%E6%A9%9F%E4%BC%9A%E3%81%AE%E5%B9%B3%E7%AD%89","dc:title":"機会の平等"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=%E3%83%A1%E3%83%AA%E3%83%88%E3%82%AF%E3%83%A9%E3%82%B7%E3%83%BC","dc:title":"メリトクラシー"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=%E5%B9%B3%E7%AD%89%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9","dc:title":"平等主義"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=%E5%AE%9F%E5%8A%B9%E7%9A%84%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1","dc:title":"実効的自由"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=John%20Rawls","dc:title":"John Rawls"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=equality%20of%20opportunity","dc:title":"equality of opportunity"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=meritocracy","dc:title":"meritocracy"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=egalitarianism","dc:title":"egalitarianism"},{"@id":"https://cir.nii.ac.jp/all?q=effective%20freedom","dc:title":"effective freedom"}],"dataSourceIdentifier":[{"@type":"JALC","@value":"oai:japanlinkcenter.org:2000992873"},{"@type":"NDL_SEARCH","@value":"oai:ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp:R000000004-I026372500"},{"@type":"CIA","@value":"130005152514"}]}