Stability of Cooperation in Reciprocal Asymmetric Structured Population

DOI 機関リポジトリ (HANDLE) オープンアクセス

書誌事項

公開日
2025-10-30
資源種別
conference paper
DOI
  • 10.5109/7395538
公開者
International Exchange and Innovation Conference on Engineering & Sciences

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説明

Reciprocity and repeated games have proven essential in the examination of the genesis of human cooperation. Population structure enhances reciprocity-based cooperation among equals, yet the effects of power asymmetry within these structured interactions remain unexplored. We explore the asymmetric power of individuals in an infinite population mixing with a positive assortment. We observed that power asymmetry destabilizes and reduces the level of cooperation in the structured population. These results have important implications for institutional design, suggesting that organizations and communities seeking to foster cooperation should implement mechanisms that mitigate power imbalances, as inequality in influence or resources fundamentally undermines collaborative potential even in otherwise cooperation-promoting network structures.

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詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390306730288302464
  • DOI
    10.5109/7395538
  • HANDLE
    2324/7395538
  • ISSN
    24341436
  • 本文言語コード
    en
  • 資料種別
    conference paper
  • データソース種別
    • JaLC
    • IRDB
    • Crossref
  • 抄録ライセンスフラグ
    使用可

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