Adverse Selection versus Moral Hazard in Financial Contracting: Evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans
Open Access
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- 内田 浩史
- 神戸大学
Bibliographic Information
- Title
- Adverse Selection versus Moral Hazard in Financial Contracting: Evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans
- Author
- Hirofumi Uchida, Iichiro Uesugi, Hiromichi Iwaki
Journal
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- HIT-REFINED Working Paper Series
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HIT-REFINED Working Paper Series 83 1-45, 2018
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1010282257213255051
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- Article Type
- journal article
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- Data Source
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- KAKEN