Uniqueness of Cumulative Causation in J. R. Commons' Institutional Economics

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This article demonstrates the uniqueness of cumulative causation in J. R. Commons' Institutional Economics (IE). It highlights the following three points. First, it establishes causation with trans-action as the focus of both the institutional change theory and the value theory. Second, it defines conflict as instances of creativity and innovation, that is, momentum for institutional evolution. Third, conflicts puts a 'will' in trans-actions, which drives the evolution of institutions and values. This article emphasizes that the will is exercised actively during negotiations, that is, will in trans-action is not a standalone authoritative will. Thus, cumulative causation in IE indicates the possibilities of bringing about institutional evolution through the will in transaction.

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