ウィトゲンシュタイン哲学における主体について（2）

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書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • On Subject in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy（2）
  • ウィトゲンシュタイン テツガク ニ オケル シュタイ ニ ツイテ(2)

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抄録

This article is the second part of a series of research on the theme of subject in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. The period is defined as his middle-period, which roughly lies between Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. In this article the author deals with the first phase of his middle-period philosophy, which started in January 1929 and ended in April 1930. He must have accepted the criticisms to the Tractatus ontology from Sraffa, Ramsey and Schlick, and couldn’t but abandon the mutual independence of elementary propositions, which is the key concept of Tractatus. Then, he put a new focus upon immediate experience and language by introducing a novel notion of grammatical form and space instead of logical form and space. It seemed to him that the problems raised with the help of his friends would be solved in the new ontological framework, but he found out another problem right away. This article discusses why and how he changed his theory.

収録刊行物

  • 学苑

    学苑 (942), 26-44, 2019-04-01

    昭和女子大学近代文化研究所

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