デカルトにおける「論証」の概念と彼の形而上学的論証の論理的基準

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書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • デカルト ニ オケル ロンショウ ノ ガイネン ト カレ ノ ケイジジョウガク
  • デカルト ニ オケル 「ロンショウ」 ノ ガイネン ト カレ ノ ケイジジョウガクテキ ロンショウ ノ ロンリテキ キジュン
  • Dekaruto ni okeru "ronsho" no gainen to kare no keijijogakuteki ronsho no ronriteki kijun
  • Cartesian notion of "proof" and his logical criterion for metaphysical proofs

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説明

type:text

It has often been pointed out that Descartes' metaphysical proofs (on Cogito, on the existance of God, and others) contained a circular argument or a logically problematic argument. One typical example of such a claim is the so called "Cartesian Circle". The purpose of this paper is to alalyse those metaphysical proofs of Descartes from the logical view point and to clarify some misunderstandings in the literatures of Descartes studies. For that aim we clarify his notion of "proof (or demonstration)" and the so called "rule of clearness and distinctness", from the logical point of view. In the course of our investigation, we also clarify the role of the notion of "memory" in his theory of proofs and knowledge. As a conclusion, we reach the view point that Descartes has a unique and coherent notion of proof, in contrast to some researchers' view point that he distinguishes two kinds of proofs, namely metaphysical proofs and scientific proofs.

1. 序論 2. 明晰判明性基準による形而上学立論に対する批判 3. Descartesにおける論証概念と現代論理学の演繹理論 4. 論証概念の二重構造説は可能か 5. Referencesと注

100集記念号

収録刊行物

  • 哲學

    哲學 100 63-86, 1996-03

    三田哲學會

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