レバノン問題と日本

The world's multipolarization phenomenon seems to have become potentially stronger in the 1980s. One of the superpowers, the Soviet Union, is in a state of inertia faced with serious economic recession and bogged down in the Polish and Afghan quagmires. The other superpower, the United States, also has become hardpressed with drastic changes in its traditional Middle-East policy after the Iranian Revolution. Similarly, a weakened Europe has recently seen the advent of new regimes in Greece, France and Spain, groping for a third course. The superpowers are trying to make up for the erosion of their old-time bipolar structure by showing force, leading to the strong possibility of a local war. So far the US Middle-East policy has been successful through supporting Israel in the heart of the Middle-East while drawing the moderate Arab states to its fold by skillfully exploiting the disunity among the Arabs. However, with the rise of Arab power, continuing such a contradiction has become extremely difficult. After losing Iran, the USA now cannot afford any instability in the Gulf states if it wants to continue as a superpower. A loss of Saudi Arabia will mean inviting another oil brisis in a recession-stricken world and such a development might eventually be associated with the fall of the USA as a world leader. The USA also cannot discard supporting unruly Israel. The recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon has achieved its military goals and Israel's satellite state of South Lebanon is making steady headway. But does the USA really benefit from this situation？ The Beirut genocide and its subsequent political developments have stimulated apublic outcry not only in the Middle-East but also in the whole world. It has made the realization of a US-1ed peace process increasingly difficult and will directly threaten the stability of the,all-important Gulf states. Japan, which depends on the Middle-Eastern oil-producing countries for its Iargest source of oil supply, must avoid contributing to the instability in that region. In order to avoid a third oil crisis as well as to ensure its stable oil supply from it in the future, Japan should give top priority to its friendly relations with the Gulf states. But the superpowers, which depend on the Middle-East oil to a lesser degree, are supporting directly or indirectly a satellite state of Lebanon under Israeli suzerainty even knowing its consequent danger. Against such a background, has come the request for Japanese economic aid for Lebanon reconstruction. But the problem is that it is not clear for what purpose, in what way and or what scale this aid should be given. The Lebanon situation is still fluid and there is a deep concern that this aid money will be utilized solely for the strongly pro-lsraeli Lebanese factions suppressing the Muslim masses. And there are real causes for such concern. In consequence, Japan will antagonize the entire Arab and Islamic world by offering such aid. For the USA, it may be all right. But can it be so for Japan, too？ Israel's Lebanon invasion, started immediately after Iran's decisive victory in the Iran.Iraq War, is in effect a kind of deadlock rather than a good idea for the USA. In such a situation, giving aid for Lebanon's rehabilitation without considering its political implications is a questionable idea against the national interests of Japan. In the midst of development of such multipolarizing trends, Japan must discover some policy of its own truly suitable to its national interests.