Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach

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This paper presents two players' equilibrium model in which bubbles of security prices occur in finite time even when both players know that the prices are bubbles. We firstly describe a Bayesian model with asymmetric information mainly based on Conlon (2004, Econometrica) and secondly extends it to non-Bayesian setting in which players cannot identify the true probability but a set of probabilities with ambiguity aversion employing epsilon contamination. We proved that in non-Bayesian approach asymmetry of information is not necessary for the existence of bubbles and that bubble prices rise more steeply than those in Bayesian.

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