On the Existence and uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players : A Cumulative-Best-Reply Approach

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Yamazaki (2009) proves that if each player's measure of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing in his or her wealth, then there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a general rentseeking game with risk-averse players, where their attitude toward risk and production functions for lotteries can differ among players. We examine cumulative best replies of players in the game to prove the same result, while Yamazaki (2009) studies share functions of the players to prove the result.

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