U.S. War Objectives against the Soviet Union: Two Strategic Approaches and Kennan’s Policy Plan

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  • ジョージ・ケナンの「封じ込め」構想と対ソ戦争目的の設定 : 政策企画本部第38号文書を中心に
  • ジョージ ケナン ノ フウジコメ コウソウ ト タイソ センソウ モクテキ ノ セッテイ セイサク キカク ホンブ ダイ38ゴウ ブンショ オ チュウシン ニ

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In 1948, George Kennan, who was the director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State, was ordered by the National Security Council (NSC) to examine the U.S. war objectives with respect to Russia. He did not believe that a war could happen between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as a policy planner, he was forced to think about the possibility of a war. Kennan believed that there were two ways of thinking about war: one was the Clausewitz thesis ("War is continuation of politics by other means"), and the other was the American thesis ("Democracy fights in anger"). Kennan pointed out that the American attitude to war was not realistic in the case of war against Russia because the Soviet Government would not accept unconditional surrender. Thus, any war that happened would be terminated by political resolution through political negotiation. Kennan submitted his report to the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff QCS), under the supervision of the NSC, ostensibly made use of his report as the basis of its war planning, but what the JCS actually planned was global war preparation in order to destroy Russia completely.

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