痛みの分析

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書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • The Analysis of Pain
  • イタミ ノ ブンセキ

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抄録

What does it mean to say "I am in pain"? First, this utterance can be descriptive, because it is a basis for truth-functional operations and therefore it is capable of being true or false. But, it isn't based on inner observation or recognition of a private phenomenon. For, in a psychological report, there is no distinction between a description and what is described. Indeed, we have no intelligible answers to the question "How do you know that you have a pain? ". Therefore, it is possible that we don't regard a sentence like "I am in pain" as a description. Second, reports on pain can be characterized as avowals (Äußerungen). They are substitutes for, and learnt extensions of, natural expressions of pain, such as cries or grimaces. They aren't descriptions of private mental entities. Sensation-language is built on a pre-linguistic structure of actions. The origin of the language game is an action, a reaction or a behaviour; only from these can more complicated games develop. Therefore, the basic form of the game can't include doubt. And an avowal is language under the conditions that (a) there are regular connections between vocalizations and actions; (b) avowals are attached to something outside our minds; (c) there are subjective qualities (qualia) of sensation. But, a sentence like "I am in pain" isn't always reduced to an avowal. That is to say, there can be an utterance that is language, but not avowal. We shouldn't think too much of the concept of avowal. Therefore, we can regard a pain as descriptive or as an avowal. The initial question is : In what sort of context does the sentence "I am in pain" occur?--This is our conclusion.

収録刊行物

  • 哲学論叢

    哲学論叢 24 76-87, 1997-09-01

    京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

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