<Articles> A Role of Redistribution in the Provision of Public Goods under Equal Contribution Schemes (Special Issue in Wester Languages)
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説明
type:01 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper
We present an n-person concooperative game model of public good provision. This economy consists of a high-income group and a low-income group. Our game is a state formation game that involves a punishment rule and installs an enforcer for the provision of public goods. We show that a voluntary redistribution by the hight-income group makes it possible to provide the public good. In such an equilibrium, the real tax burden of a high-income individual is heavier than that of a low-income individual; thus, progressive income taxes emerge.
収録刊行物
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- 大阪経大論集
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大阪経大論集 58 (3), 51-68, 2007-09-15
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050282677439787008
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- NII論文ID
- 120005534480
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00028448
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- ISSN
- 04747909
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- departmental bulletin paper
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- データソース種別
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- IRDB
- CiNii Articles