Husserl and Heidegger on the certainty of sum ("I am")

Abe, Hiroshi

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Other Title

<我あり(sum)>の確実性 --フッサールとハイデガー (新宮一成教授退職記念号)
〈我あり(sum)〉の確実性 : フッサールとハイデガー
〈ワレアリ(sum)〉ノカクジツセイ : フッサールトハイデガー

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Description

As shown in his unpublished manuscript Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage [Testament of the Question of Being], Martin Heidegger's last years saw him have an idea of "Phänomenóphasis" [= phainómenon + phásis], which should be contrasted with classical phenomenology. This paper aims at clarifying what makes Heidegger's phenomenophasis different from Husserlian phenomenology. For this purpose, we compare Husserl with Heidegger in terms of the certainty of one's own existence. According to Husserl's Ideen I, nothing can be more certain than the pure Ego's being, because this is fully and directly given in its self-reflection. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that Dasein's fundamental certainty lies in its own possibility of dying, i. e. the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein as such: In order to be convinced of its own existence, Dasein should be faced with the possibility that it does not exist any more and understand itself as authentic self or "nobody" from a worldly point of view. Based on this comparative consideration, we finally provide a possible interpretation that Husserlian phenomenology regards the self as self-transparent, whereas Heidegger's phenomenophasis emphasizes that it remains the ever-questioning enigmatic self.

Journal

人間存在論

人間存在論 22 63-76, 2016-07-01

京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科『人間存在論』刊行会