Japanese Corporate Governance Problem and Economic Efficiency : An Empirical Analysis of Japanese Manufacturing Firms

IR Web Site

Search this article

Abstract

We investigate how the Japanese governance characteristics hurt shareholders’ value focusing on the rent distribution problem between two residual claimant parties, shareholders and employees. We find that lower Tobin’s Q under Japanese governance characteristics is mainly attributed to the rent distribution problem, not to a decrease in productivity. We argue that pros and cons of a governance characteristic should be valued not only from the viewpoint of shareholders value but also by that of value added. In other words, corporate governance system that enhances employee-oriented management may be rational when valued from the viewpoint of value added.

Journal

  • オイコノミカ

    オイコノミカ 45 (2), 41-64, 2008-11-01

    名古屋 : 名古屋市立大学経済学会

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top