A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with Public Verifiability

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  • Second price Sealed bid Auction with Public Verifiability
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A second-price sealed-bid auction is that wherea bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price.This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret.We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.

A second-price sealed-bid auction is that wherea bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price.This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret.We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results, and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.

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