書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Second price Sealed bid Auction with Public Verifiability
- 暗号プロトコル
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説明
A second-price sealed-bid auction is that wherea bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price.This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret.We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.
A second-price sealed-bid auction is that wherea bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price.This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret.We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results, and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.
収録刊行物
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- 情報処理学会論文誌
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情報処理学会論文誌 43 (8), 1405-2413, 2002-08-15
情報処理学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050282812860654208
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- NII論文ID
- 110002726430
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00116647
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- ISSN
- 18827764
- 03875806
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- NDL書誌ID
- 6261668
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- データソース種別
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