type:text

The logical analysis of historical explanation has provoked much discussions among Anglo-American philosophers. They proposed two different types of logic for historical explanation. The one was the covering-law-theory which was regarded as a general form of causal explanation of all empirical sciences, while the other was a-continuous-series-explanation which they supposed to be characteristic of historical science. The aim of the former was to attain scientific rigour in this field of reseach, though it has in fact never been fully achieved. On the other hand, the latter seemed to be best fitted for the explanation of historical events, for it was found in^ the ordinary historical narration. Prof. Gardiner says that every historical fact should be explained so-and-so in terms of motive-language of persons in such-and-such circumstances. This is called the logic of situation, which does not require more than common-sense understanding or everyday rationality. Can historian be satisfied with this sort of explanation ? Some historians, like L. von Ranke, have felt that there are something indefinable, not reducible to the individual motives, though they cannot make it clear. I wish to suggest, in this article, that the history itself should be divided in two types, one of which can be explained by situational logic and the other cannot, that is, the micro-history and the macro-history. How can we, then, analyse the macro-history ? Continental philosophers of history since the days of antiquity have wrestled with the problem of free will and necessity in history from the standpoint of macro-history. It has always been a puzzling enigma for most historians. Hegel had answered this problem by his metaphysical scheme of List der Vernunft, which we the contemporary philosophers of history should attempt to analyse scientifically in order to go beyond the micro-history. Prof. Popper, with his severe criticism, had refuted the logic of holistic determinism of historicism. However he never accepted the logic of situation unconditionally. He frankly admits the existence of vacuum in history which is not reducible to the situational logic, but he demands to fill it with something more sensible. I agree with this opinion of his. It will be a search for something beyond the logic of situation. Prof. Ichii, going on this same direction, presents a philosophical concept called Key-person. The key-person is a free agent in history who actualizes one of the various basic social conditions. It seems to me that Prof. Ichii tries to unite the logic of macro-history of Marxism with the logic of Micro-history of analytic philosophy. This seems to be future problem of analytic philosophy. I have a sympathy with this approach fundamentaly and I wish, in this article, to further develop some basic concepts of it. I am trying to point out that the key-person should be interpreted as a subject of behaviours of an organized social body, and it will be the final object of our analysis to find out what causes this organized behaviour of a social body and what is universal model.