Maximum size of social security in a model of endogenous fertility

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Description

Social security tends to be unsustainable in nature. It reduces individuals'' demand for children as a measure to support their lifestyle during old age, which in turn undermines the financial basis of social security. Using a simple overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and income transfer from children to parents, we discuss the maximum size of a pay-as-you-go social security program that can prevent a cumulative reduction of fertility and make a program sustainable. We also show that a child-care allowance raises the maximum size of the program and raises an individual''s lifetime utility.

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Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1050287540600853888
  • NII Article ID
    120006929951
  • ISSN
    15452921
  • HANDLE
    10086/23049
  • Text Lang
    en
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • Data Source
    • IRDB
    • CiNii Articles
    • KAKEN

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