PARETO OPTIMALITY, CORE AND EQUILIBRIA IN A COOPERATIVE SUPER GAME WITHOUT SIDE PAYMENTS
抄録
type:text
In this paper, we define a supergame payoff as the lim inf of average payoffs. We discuss the relationship between a single-period n-person cooperative game and the corresponding supergame, for notions of Pareto optimality, Nash-equilibrium, the α-core and the β-core.
収録刊行物
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- Keio economic studies
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Keio economic studies 24 (1), 25-41, 1987
Keio Economic Society, Keio University
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050564287356046848
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- ISSN
- 00229709
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- データソース種別
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- IRDB