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説明
This paper presents a simple two-stage lobbying competition model of tariff determination. In the first stage, domestic firms lobby for tariff protection, an anti-tariff group of domestic consumers or foreign firms lobbies against tariff protection and then the government sets a specific tariff rate. In the second stage, given the tariff rate determined in the first stage, domestic and foreign firms set their output level à la Cournot. This paper will show in the lobbying competition model with a specific functional form that the equilibrium tariff rate can be a non-monotone function of the number of agents in an interest group.
収録刊行物
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- 新潟大学経済論集
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新潟大学経済論集 93 53-73, 2012-09
新潟大学経済学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050564289191798272
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- NII論文ID
- 120006744106
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00183269
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- ISSN
- 02861569
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- HANDLE
- 10191/20409
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- NDL書誌ID
- 024050884
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- departmental bulletin paper
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- データソース種別
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- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles