「説明」から「理解」へ : 歴史的理解の問題へ向けて

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Other Title
  • 「セツメイ」 カラ 「リカイ」 エ : レキシテキ リカイ ノ モンダイ エ ムケテ
  • "Setsumei" kara "rikai" e : rekishiteki rikai no mondai e mukete
  • From "Explanation" to "Understanding"

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歴史的説明のいわゆるポッパー・ヘンペル理論に対する最近の重要な批判は、ドレイ、ドナガン、ミンクらによって与えられている。私は一でこれらの批判を補強し、二でこの説明問題に、ポッパー・ヘンペル理論とは異なった視点をスケッチ風に導入してみたい。 In Part One of this paper I shall comment on the Popper-Hempel theory of historical explanation. I will point out the case which conforms to the deductive-nomological model of explanation, but nevertheless cannot properly be called explanation. However, the emphasis of my criticism will be placed on the inadequacy of the inductive-probabilistic model of explanation which has been formulated by C.G. Hempel. This model should be considered a device for prediction rather than a model of explanation. In Part Two I shall try to construct what might be called a Collingwoodian position of historical understanding. In order to characterize the semantic nature of historical description, I will introduce the categorical distinction between action and event, in terms of which some of the confusions underlying the positivist's or 'science-oriented' conception of history can be revealed and cleared up. Predicates of sentences can be classified in two ways with regard to their relationship to subjects: some sort of predicates such as 'promise' cannot be attributed to their subjects, while others can be, even if the subjects have no understanding of the predicates. I suppose that the meanings of such predicates are intrinsically combined with the internal ideas of the people to which these predicates are attributed, and that, therefore, they cannot be reduced to any sort of physicalistic terms. My research results suggest a relevant reason why history is, and should be, narrated in everyday language rather than in 'quantified' terms. I will also advocate a humanistic method of historical inquiry, pointing out that we cannot evaluate, even identify, the actions of our historical figures, unless we take the same criteria of judgement as those which they embraced. Through these arguments I hope to reinterpret such terms as 're-enactment' or 'understanding' (Verstehen) which were familiar to the Neo-Kantians and Idealists.

論文

Journal

  • 史学

    史学 46 (4), 57(409)-77(429), 1975-06

    三田史学会

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