Alternative Objectives in an Oligopoly Model : An Aggregative Game Approach

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説明

A rapidly growing literature analyzes models in which firms maximize objectives other than profit and enjoy market power. Examples include the labor-managed firm, mixed oligopoly, and delegation models. These models typically retain the aggregative structure of the conventional Cournot model of imperfect competition. We exploit this fact and apply the framework recently developed by Cornes and Hartley (2005, 2011) to analyze the properties of the equilibrium in such games. We show that existing treatments often make more restrictive assumptions than necessary to generate their results. Specifically, we identify conditions sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium, and we explore the comparative static properties of these conditions.

収録刊行物

  • Discussion Paper, Series A

    Discussion Paper, Series A 307 1-31, 2016-11-06

    Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University

キーワード

詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1050845763951805952
  • NII論文ID
    120005859746
  • DOI
    10.2139/ssrn.2887957
  • ISSN
    15565068
  • HANDLE
    10419/149278
    2115/63516
  • 本文言語コード
    en
  • 資料種別
    departmental bulletin paper
  • データソース種別
    • IRDB
    • CiNii Articles
    • OpenAIRE

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