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抄録
According to Hwang- Mai [1990] a monopolist facing a fixed number of markets with linear demands can yield smaller output and yet greater welfare under discriminatory rather than nondiscriminatory mill pricing policy. Unfortunately this is an untenable proposition flawed by a wrong simulation. We find that within the confines of their simulation parameters it is the nondiscriminatory pricing policy that yields strictly greater welfare than does discriminatory pricing with no regulation. This does not necessarily mean that the Hwang-Mai conclusion is untenable, but it does reveal the risk of careless simulation that leads to nowhere.
収録刊行物
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- 新潟大学経済論集
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新潟大学経済論集 87 175-183, 2009-09
新潟大学経済学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050845764164011264
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- NII論文ID
- 120006740770
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00183269
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- ISSN
- 02861569
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- HANDLE
- 10191/9596
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- NDL書誌ID
- 10455765
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- departmental bulletin paper
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- データソース種別
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- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles