Freemium on Advertising Platforms
書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Freemium competition among ad-sponsored platforms
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説明
This paper studies competition between ad-sponsored platforms that strategically determine business models. In addition to basic services including annoying advertisements, each platform decides whether to introduce an ad-free premium service (i.e., a freemium business model). Freemium platforms encounter a trade-off between increasing the number of premium users for the subscription-based revenues and increasing the number of basic users for the ad-sponsored revenues. I characterize how the freemium platforms should segment their users into basic and premium services. Moreover, I show that the equilibrium business model choice depends on the extent of fixed costs for introducing a premium service. When the fixed cost is at an intermediate level, asymmetric equilibria may arise: i.e., only one platform introduces the premium service. Competing platforms may have an incentive to coordinate their choices toward asymmetric market structures; however, these structures can be harmful to both consumers and advertisers.
収録刊行物
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- Information Economics and Policy
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Information Economics and Policy 50 100848-, 2020-03
Elsevier B.V.
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050856995322502912
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- NII論文ID
- 120006843568
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- NII書誌ID
- AA10632028
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- ISSN
- 18735975
- 15565068
- 01676245
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- HANDLE
- 20.500.14094/90007088
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- データソース種別
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