An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
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説明
Chessa M., Hanaki N., Lardon A., et al. An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior 141, 88 (2023); https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010.
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
収録刊行物
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- Games and Economic Behavior
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Games and Economic Behavior 141 88-104, 2023-06-20
Elsevier
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050862643876367104
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- NII書誌ID
- AA11537077
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- ISSN
- 10902473
- 15565068
- 08998256
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- HANDLE
- 11094/92343
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- データソース種別
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- IRDB
- Crossref
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE
