<Discontinuité> in the Bergsonian notion of <durée> : Paradoxically after bachelard
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- Murakami, Ryu
- Yamaguchi University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- ベルクソン的「持続」における「不連続性」の契機 : バシュラールによる批判を逆説的な導きとして
- ベルクソン テキ ジゾク ニ オケル フレンゾクセイ ノ ケイキ : バシュラール ニヨル ヒハン オ ギャクセツ テキ ナ ミチビキ ト シテ
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Abstract
In this paper I will consider <discontinuité> as a positive element of the Bergsonian notion of <durée>. Since his maiden book, Time and Free Will (1889), Henri Bergson (1859-1941) defines time as <durée>, which means uninterrupted continuity of the past, the present and the future. In opposition to Bergson, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), who begins to speculate on time in the 1930s, takes time to be essentially discontinuous. According to Bachelard, it is not continuous <durée> but discontinuous <instant> that does give birth to something new, and this is why he criticizes Bergson. In my opinion, however, at least in the 1930s, Bergson himself tries to reconsider <durée> not only to be continuous but also to be discontinuous.
Journal
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- The philosophical studies of Yamaguchi University
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The philosophical studies of Yamaguchi University 31 27-36, 2024-03-23
山口大学哲学研究会
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1050863008862995712
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- NII Book ID
- AN10403441
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- NDL BIB ID
- 033534007
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- ISSN
- 0919357X
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Article Type
- departmental bulletin paper
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- Data Source
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- IRDB
- NDL