Inference on noncooperative entry deterrence

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Description

This study empirically investigates strategic entry-deterrence behavior under oligopolistic competition. I develop a structural econometric model describing incumbents' entry-deterrence behavior based on the framework of Gilbert and Vives. I show theoretically that incumbents' marginal costs are interval-identified under the assumption that incumbents deter entry in equilibrium. The structural model is estimated using data from the Japanese aluminum smelting industry. A Vuong-type model selection test utilizing an instrument demonstrates that the entry-deterrence model is more consistent with the data than an ordinary Cournot competition model without entry threats.

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Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1050864092954279296
  • ISSN
    15309134
    10586407
  • HANDLE
    20.500.14094/0100491411
  • Text Lang
    en
  • Article Type
    journal article
  • Data Source
    • IRDB

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