A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions

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書誌事項

公開日
2016-03-16
資源種別
journal article
権利情報
  • http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor
DOI
  • 10.1111/1468-0106.12090
公開者
Wiley

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説明

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">N</jats:styled-content>ash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">N</jats:styled-content>ash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">N</jats:styled-content>ash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.</jats:p>

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