Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

  • Takehiro Ito
    Faculty of Policy Studies, Iwate Prefectural University, Sugo, Takizawa, Iwate , Japan
  • Akihiro Suzuki
    Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University, Chome-4-12 Kojirakawamachi, Yamagata , Japan
  • Toru Takemoto
    Faculty of Economics, Tezukayama University, 7 Chome-1-1 Tezukayama, Nara , Japan
  • Kazuhito Ogawa
    Center for Experimental Economics, Faculty of Sociology, Kansai University, 3 Chome-3-35 Yamatecho, Suita, Osaka , Japan
  • Hiromasa Takahashi
    Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, 3 Chome-4-1 Ozukahigashi, Asaminami Ward, Hiroshima , Japan

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<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p> We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.</jats:p>

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