Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments
-
- Takehiro Ito
- Faculty of Policy Studies, Iwate Prefectural University, Sugo, Takizawa, Iwate , Japan
-
- Akihiro Suzuki
- Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University, Chome-4-12 Kojirakawamachi, Yamagata , Japan
-
- Toru Takemoto
- Faculty of Economics, Tezukayama University, 7 Chome-1-1 Tezukayama, Nara , Japan
-
- Kazuhito Ogawa
- Center for Experimental Economics, Faculty of Sociology, Kansai University, 3 Chome-3-35 Yamatecho, Suita, Osaka , Japan
-
- Hiromasa Takahashi
- Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, 3 Chome-4-1 Ozukahigashi, Asaminami Ward, Hiroshima , Japan
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p> We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.</jats:p>
収録刊行物
-
- German Economic Review
-
German Economic Review 17 (4), 425-437, 2016-12-01
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Tweet
詳細情報 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1360004235518258816
-
- ISSN
- 14680475
- 14656485
-
- 資料種別
- journal article
-
- データソース種別
-
- Crossref
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE