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Revision Games
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- Yuichiro Kamada
- Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
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- Michihiro Kandori
- Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
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Description
<jats:p>This paper proposes a class of games called <jats:italic>revision games</jats:italic>. In a revision game, players start with initially prepared actions, followed by a sequence of random revision opportunities until a predetermined deadline. In the course of revisions, players monitor each other's behavior. It is shown that players can cooperate and that their behavior under the optimal equilibrium is described by a simple differential equation. We present the necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation to be sustained in revision games. We also present applications to the preopening activities in the stock exchange and to an electoral campaign. </jats:p>
Journal
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- Econometrica
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Econometrica 88 (4), 1599-1630, 2020
The Econometric Society
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1360009142929583744
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- ISSN
- 00129682
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- Article Type
- journal article
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- Data Source
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- Crossref
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE
