COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS

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  • FRANÇOISE FORGES
    CEREMADE and LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cedex 16, France
  • ROBERTO SERRANO
    Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA

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<jats:p> This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in noncooperative Bayesian games. </jats:p>

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