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- Per Pettersson-Lidbom
- Department of Economics, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden.
説明
<jats:p>This paper develops an empirical framework for the problem of soft budgets which is explicitly based on a dynamic commitment problem, i.e., the inability of a supporting organization to commit itself not to extend more resources ex post to a budget-constrained organization than it was prepared to provide ex ante. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since the central government distributed a large number of fiscal transfers. The estimated soft-budget effect is economically significant: on average, a local government increases its debt by more than 20 percent by going from a hard to a soft budget constraint. (JEL D82, G32, L32)</jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (3), 154-179, 2010-08-01
American Economic Association
