Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey

DOI Web Site 17 Citations
  • Sven de Vries
    Zentrum Mathematik, TU München, D-80290 München, Germany
  • Rakesh V. Vohra
    Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA

Description

<jats:p> Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes, network routing, and furniture. Because of complementarities or substitution effects between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This paper surveys the state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions and presents some new insights. Periodic updates of portions of this survey will be posted to this journal's Online Supplements web page at http://joc.pubs.informs.org/OnlineSupplements.html </jats:p>

Journal

  • INFORMS Journal on Computing

    INFORMS Journal on Computing 15 (3), 284-309, 2003-08

    Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

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