Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

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  • Wim De Neys
    Laboratory for the Psychology of Child Development and Education, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Paris
  • Gordon Pennycook
    Paul J. Hill School of Business, University of Regina

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<jats:p> Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models. </jats:p>

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