抄録
<jats:p>In “The Refutation of Idealism,” G.E. Moore observed that, “when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous” (1922, 25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular, have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against qualia, usually called “the argument from diaphanousness or transparency” . But even its friends concede that it is none too clear what <jats:italic>the argument from diaphanousness—</jats:italic>as I will call it—is. The purpose of this paper is to formulate the argument, and to assess its merits. My conclusion will be that qualia realists have little to fear from the argument—provided both qualia and diaphanousness are properly understood.</jats:p><jats:p>I begin by making a number of preliminary points about the contemporary background of the argument, its different versions, and the proper understanding of its target.</jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 30 341-390, 2004
Cambridge University Press (CUP)