Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition

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書誌事項

公開日
2021-12-06
資源種別
journal article
権利情報
  • https://journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license
DOI
  • 10.1177/09516298211061161
  • 10.2139/ssrn.3140241
公開者
SAGE Publications

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説明

<jats:p>This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority rules may not always lead to moderate policies once electoral competition is considered.</jats:p>

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