Fairness concerns and job assignment to positions with different surplus

DOI DOI Web Site Web Site 参考文献52件 オープンアクセス
  • Katarína Danková
    MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory, Macquarie Business School North Ryde Australia
  • Hodaka Morita
    Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Tokyo Japan
  • Maroš Servátka
    MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory, Macquarie Business School North Ryde Australia
  • Le Zhang
    MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory, Macquarie Business School North Ryde Australia

この論文をさがす

説明

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>How does job assignment to positions with different surplus affect fairness concerns? We experimentally examine agents' fairness concerns in a three‐person ultimatum game in which all agents are asked to complete a general knowledge quiz before being assigned to a high‐stake or low‐stake position. We disentangle two possible channels through which job assignment impacts fairness concerns, wage differences, and the principal's intentions, by comparing cases in which the job assignment is determined randomly or by the principal. The knowledge quiz, which mimics performance evaluation, signifies the distinction between the two cases as it provides a basis on which the principal can make the assignment decision. We find that the principal's intentions significantly impact fairness concerns of the agents assigned to the low‐stake position, but wage differences themselves do not. We elaborate on managerial implications of our findings.</jats:p>

収録刊行物

参考文献 (52)*注記

もっと見る

関連プロジェクト

もっと見る

キーワード

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ