The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice

DOI Web Site Web Site 被引用文献1件
  • Gilbert Roberts
    Independent Researcher, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
  • Nichola Raihani
    Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, UK
  • Redouan Bshary
    Department of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel 2009, Switzerland
  • Héctor M. Manrique
    Department of Psicología y Sociología, Universidad de Zaragoza, Teruel, Teruel 44003, Spain
  • Andrea Farina
    Leiden University, Leiden, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands
  • Flóra Samu
    Linköping University, Linköping, Östergötland, Sweden
  • Pat Barclay
    Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1

説明

<jats:p>When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans.</jats:p><jats:p>This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.</jats:p>

収録刊行物

被引用文献 (1)*注記

もっと見る

問題の指摘

ページトップへ