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説明
Abstract We analyze the behavior of two-person teams and individuals who repeatedly play the game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory. When teams play OʼNeillʼs 4 × 4 game against another team, the choice frequencies are consistent with equilibrium of the game at the decision-maker level. In contrast, individuals against another individual play far from equilibrium, as previous experiments have found. The hide-and-seek game experiment reveals that teamsʼ behavior is less heterogeneous than individuals. When teams play OʼNeillʼs game against individuals, teams win at above the equilibrium rate in one treatment, but not in the other.
収録刊行物
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- Games and Economic Behavior
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Games and Economic Behavior 77 (1), 168-180, 2013-01
Elsevier BV
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1360285707143900800
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- ISSN
- 08998256
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- データソース種別
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- Crossref
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE