Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure

DOI Web Site 参考文献30件
  • Kangsik Choi
    Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Busandaehak-ro 63 beon-gil 2, Geumjeong-gu, Busan 46241, Republic of Korea
  • DongJoon Lee
    Faculty of Commerce, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, 4-4 Sagamine, Komenoki-cho Nissin-shi, Aichi 470-0193, Japan
  • Seonyoung Lim
    Investment Promotion Division, Busan Metropolitan City, 1001 Jungang-daero, Yeonje-gu, Busan, Republic of Korea

書誌事項

公開日
2016-12-08
資源種別
journal article
DOI
  • 10.1080/09638199.2016.1262892
公開者
Informa UK Limited

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説明

ABSTRACTWith strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).

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