- 【Updated on May 12, 2025】 Integration of CiNii Dissertations and CiNii Books into CiNii Research
- Trial version of CiNii Research Knowledge Graph Search feature is available on CiNii Labs
- 【Updated on June 30, 2025】Suspension and deletion of data provided by Nikkei BP
- Regarding the recording of “Research Data” and “Evidence Data”
Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods
-
- Hans-Theo Normann
- Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Universitaet Duesseldorf, Duesseldorf, Germany
-
- Holger A. Rau
- University of Erlangen–Nuremberg, Nuremberg, Germany
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
-
- One versus Two Provision Levels
Search this article
Description
<jats:p> In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and payoffs, even though second movers often punish first movers who give less than half of the threshold contribution. The additional second step level—which is not feasible in standard Nash equilibrium—leads to higher contributions but does not improve public-good provision and lowers payoffs. We calibrate the parameters of Fehr and Schmidt’s model of inequality aversion to make quantitative predictions. We find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with several predictions in a quantitative sense. </jats:p>
Journal
-
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
-
Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (7), 1273-1300, 2014-05-06
SAGE Publications
- Tweet
Details 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1360294646613748736
-
- ISSN
- 15528766
- 00220027
-
- Data Source
-
- Crossref