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- Liang Guo
- Department of Marketing, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
書誌事項
- 公開日
- 2009-09
- DOI
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- 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1035
- 公開者
- Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:p> Firms normally disclose quality information to consumers using two alternative formats: either directly to consumers or indirectly through downstream retailers. This study investigates optimal disclosure strategies/formats in a channel setting with bilateral monopolies. It shows that retail disclosure leads to more equilibrium information revelation. This is because the manufacturer can, through wholesale price cuts, partially absorb the retailer's effective disclosure cost and thus increase the retailer's incentive for disclosure. The conditions under which a particular disclosure format arises as the manufacturer's optimal choice are also examined. Even though direct disclosure is the ex post dominated option, the manufacturer may benefit from committing ex ante to the direct disclosure format when the cost of disclosure is sufficiently high. </jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- Management Science
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Management Science 55 (9), 1513-1526, 2009-09
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)