Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer

DOI HANDLE PDF Web Site PubMed 被引用文献9件 参考文献39件 オープンアクセス

書誌事項

公開日
2013-03-13
資源種別
journal article
権利情報
  • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
  • https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
DOI
  • 10.1038/srep01435
公開者
Springer Science and Business Media LLC

説明

How natural selection can promote cooperative or altruistic behavior is a fundamental question in biological and social sciences. One of the persuasive mechanisms is "indirect reciprocity," working through reputation: cooperative behavior can prevail because the behavior builds the donor's good reputation and then s/he receives some reciprocal benefits from someone else in the community. However, an important piece missed in the previous studies is that the reputation-building process requires substantial cognitive abilities such as communication skills, potentially causing a loss of biological fitness. Here, by mathematical analyses and individual-based computer simulations, we show that natural selection never favors indirect reciprocal cooperation in the presence of the cost of reputation building, regardless of the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation or moral assessment rules (social norms). Our results highlight the importance of considering the cost of high-level cognitive abilities in studies of the evolution of humans' and animals' social behavior.

収録刊行物

  • Scientific Reports

    Scientific Reports 3 (1), 1435-, 2013-03-13

    Springer Science and Business Media LLC

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