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- Adam Bear
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511;
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- David G. Rand
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511;
書誌事項
- 公開日
- 2016-01-11
- 権利情報
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- http://www.pnas.org/preview_site/misc/userlicense.xhtml
- DOI
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- 10.1073/pnas.1517780113
- 公開者
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
この論文をさがす
説明
<jats:title>Significance</jats:title> <jats:p> The role of intuition versus deliberation in human cooperation has received widespread attention from experimentalists across the behavioral sciences in recent years. Yet a formal theoretical framework for addressing this question has been absent. Here, we introduce an evolutionary game-theoretic model of dual-process agents playing prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that, across many types of environments, evolution only ever favors agents who ( <jats:italic>i</jats:italic> ) always intuitively defect, or ( <jats:italic>ii</jats:italic> ) are intuitively predisposed to cooperate but who, when deliberating, switch to defection if it is in their self-interest to do so. Our model offers a clear explanation for why we should expect deliberation to promote selfishness rather than cooperation and unifies apparently contradictory empirical results regarding intuition and cooperation. </jats:p>
収録刊行物
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- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (4), 936-941, 2016-01-11
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences