Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A “Labeled Cash Transfer” for Education

  • Najy Benhassine
    The World Bank, 1818 H St. NW Washington, DC 20433 (e-mail: )
  • Florencia Devoto
    Paris School of Economics, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France and Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL) (e-mail: )
  • Esther Duflo
    Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge MA 02142 and National Bureau of Economics (NBER) (e-mail: )
  • Pascaline Dupas
    Stanford Department of Economics, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford CA 94305 and NBER (e-mail: )
  • Victor Pouliquen
    Paris School of Economics 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France and JPAL (e-mail: )

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<jats:p> Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have been shown to increase human capital investments, but their standard features make them expensive. We use a large randomized experiment in Morocco to estimate an alternative government-run program, a “labeled cash transfer” (LCT): a small cash transfer made to fathers of school-aged children in poor rural communities, not conditional on school attendance but explicitly labeled as an education support program. We document large gains in school participation. Adding conditionality and targeting mothers made almost no difference in our context. The program increased parents' belief that education was a worthwhile investment, a likely pathway for the results. (JEL H23, I24, 128, I38, J24, O15, O18) </jats:p>

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