Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test

書誌事項

公開日
2019-09-30
資源種別
journal article
権利情報
  • https://www.pnas.org/site/aboutpnas/licenses.xhtml
DOI
  • 10.1073/pnas.1910095116
公開者
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

この論文をさがす

説明

<jats:title>Significance</jats:title> <jats:p>Many unique features of human communication, cooperation, and culture depend on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. But is theory of mind uniquely human? Nonhuman animals, such as humans’ closest ape relatives, have succeeded in some theory-of-mind tasks; however, it remains disputed whether they do so by reading others’ minds or their behavior. Here, we challenged this behavior-rule account using a version of the goggles test, incorporated into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief task with apes. We provide evidence that, in the absence of behavioral cues, apes consulted their own past experience of seeing or not seeing through a novel barrier to determine whether an agent could see through the same barrier.</jats:p>

収録刊行物

被引用文献 (11)*注記

もっと見る

参考文献 (42)*注記

もっと見る

関連プロジェクト

もっと見る

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ