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Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs
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- Akio Kawasaki
- Faculty of Economics Oita University Oita Japan
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- Takao Ohkawa
- Faculty of Economics Ritsumeikan University Shiga Japan
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- Makoto Okamura
- Waseda Institute of Modern Political Economy Waseda University Tokyo Japan
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Description
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk‐dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.</jats:p>
Journal
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- Australian Economic Papers
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Australian Economic Papers 59 (2), 71-87, 2020-02-23
Wiley
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1360849945379818880
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- ISSN
- 14678454
- 0004900X
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- Article Type
- journal article
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- Data Source
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- Crossref
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE